Abstract. We develop a model of industry evolution to study the process of vertical integration and disintegration specialization. Absent industry level increasing returns, an industry will be vertically integrated in the long run if and only if transaction costs are greater than the costs of coordinating within a rm. However, convergence to the e cient industry structure may take very long and may not be monotonic: For long periods of time, the industry structure may diverge from its long run equilibrium of vertical integration. When transaction costs depend on the extent of specialization, there can be path dependence and ine ciency even in the very long run. Even when specialization is e cient, the industry may become vertically integrated.
I Introduction
When more than one economic activity is required to produce a good, rms can specialize or integrate all the necessary activities in one organization. These choices are widely believed to condition the pro ts a rm earns. A substantial literature has argued that vertical integration takes place when the costs of transacting across rm boundaries outweigh the bene ts of specialization e.g. Coase 1937 , Williamson 1979 . However, transaction costs may themselves depend on the extent to which other rms are specialized and thus, on the extent to which the industry is vertically integrated. This argues for analyzing vertical integration at the level of the industry and not just as a rm level phenomenon.
The economics of specialization has old roots in the economics literature, going as far back as Adam Smith's idea of division of labor. A division of labor permits workers to focus on tasks where they enjoy a comparative advantage, and thus, increases the e ciency of the system as a whole. Although initially intended to apply to the division of tasks within a factory, the idea of division of labor can be easily extended to the division of labor amongst rms, rather than among workers inside a rm. However, unlike in a factory, the mechanisms for coordinating the division of tasks across rms is not the Chandlerian visible hand" but rather its less visible Smithian counterpart. How e ective are price signals at coordinating the decisions of rms and guiding the industry towards the long run cost minimizing structure when the future is uncertain?
The point of departure for our paper is that the choices of rms may b e i n terdependent. If rms behave strategically e.g., Farrell, Monroe and Saloner 1998 or if they are boundedly rational as in this paper, these interdependencies may cause industry structure to evolve away, at least for some time, from the steady state structure. In this paper we explore how the degree of vertical integration in an industry evolves over time. Absent industry level increasing returns, an industry will be vertically integrated in the long run if and only if integration is e cient in the sense that it minimizes long run costs. However, convergence to the ecient industry structure may take very long and may not be monotonic: There are asymmetries, albeit transient, between the entry processes for specialized and integrated rms. For instance, when specialization and vertical integration are equally e cient, specialization turns out to be the more likely outcome. Further, when transaction costs themselves fall with the extent of specialization, there can be path dependence and ine ciency even in the very long run e.g., David 1985 , Arthur 1989 . 1 Even when specialization is e cient, the industry may become vertically integrated.
We develop a simple model where the nal good requires two components. For ease of exposition we shall call them hardware and software, each produced by a separate activity. There are three key elements of our story. The rst recalls a long-standing advantage of specialization rst noted by Charles Babbage more than a century ago, Specialization allows agents workers, rms to concentrate on activities that they do best. 2 Whereas, an integrated rm has to master an array of activities and processes, a specialized rm needs to master only a few. In our model, this implies that an integrated rm is less likely to arise than equally competent and separate specialized rms.
Second, when a rm has di erent levels of e ciency in the two activities, relying upon its own resources can act as a drag on the more e cient activity. This e ect called here the division of labor e ect is incorporated into our model by assuming increasing marginal costs for the two activities. A rm that carries out both activities internally cannot take the full advantage of the activity in which i t is more e cient because it is forced up the marginal cost curve of the less e cient activity. By specializing in the more e cient activity i t w ould, in essence, face a at marginal cost curve for the other activity e.g. Stigler, 1951 . 3 The nal element of our story appeals to the coordination problems in the dynamic process of division of labor. Division of labor implies trade between specialized agents. Hence, the payo to specialization for any rm depends on the e ciency of the sector supplying complementary products. If so, an industry which becomes vertically integrated early in its history may prove t o b e v ery di cult for a specialized rm to enter, thereby preserving vertical integration. In this set up, the coordination problem arises in part because a specialized entrant cannot coordinate with another entrant producing the complementary input. This coordination e ect is important either when the two t ypes of specialized rms di er 1 See Katz and Shapiro 1994 and Besen and Farrell 1994 for a discussion of positive feedbacks due to network externalities and other issues related to standardization.
2 ... The master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be executed into di erent processes, each requiring di erent degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that precise quantity of both which is necessary for each process; whereas, if the whole work were executed by one workman, that person must possess su cient skill to perform the most di cult, and su cient strength to execute the most laborious, of the operations into which the art is divided." Babbage, 175-6, quoted in Rosenberg 1994: 28 , italics ours. 3 In our model, specialization in one activity d o e s h a v e an opportunity cost in that the rm may still earn positive rents from its activity in the other organizational form.
in number and cost as may happen in the course of industry evolution or when there are externalities, such as when transaction costs fall with the level of industry specialization. In the latter case, coordination failure can lead to ine ciently high integration.
The history of several industries illustrates these dynamic forces. In the computer industry, IBM's decision to unbundle its software business from its hardware business, and license its operating system from Microsoft is said to have been instrumental in the creation of the software industry see for example, Dorfman 1987 , Langlois 1992 , Cortada 1993 . Likewise, one sees evidence that initial conditions in the evolution of the disk-drive industry may h a v e a ected the pattern of specialization in that industry. 4 Arora and Gambardella 1998 document that the emergence of specialized engineering rms a class of rms that specialized in the design of chemical process plant s w as accompanied by an increase in the number of chemicals producers.
In many industries, division of labor was facilitated by the emergence of well de ned standards that allowed specialized rms to produce complementary products that could be mixed-and-matched". Recent industry case studies of computer software Cottrell 1996 Farrell, Monroe and Saloner 1998 , provide a model of industry structure similar in spirit to one provided in this paper. Assuming zero transaction costs, they nd that industry con guration with specialization is more e cient. They also nd that when there are many producers, industry con gurations with specialization yield lower pro ts and hence are less likely. Unlike Farrell et al., we explicitly investigate the dynamics of industry structure in a competitive market setting, albeit with boundedly rational rms. We explore how di erences in entry and exit prospects of specialized and integrated rms interact with di erences in the long term e ciency of the two forms. However, we neglect the strategic interactions that Farrell et al. model. In their model, rms are Bertrand competitors so that price and pro ts depend only on the cost of the second most e cient producer they also show that their results extend to Cournot competition as well. Thus, the increase in e ciency due to specialization is more than outweighed by the increase in the toughness of competition" when the number of competitors is large. In our 4 This industry came into existence in 1956 with the invention of the disk drives at IBM. Initially, IBM developed and designed the disk drives itself, while employing vendors for the manufacturing process. In time, the existence of a large vendor base allowed entry for competitors Such as Storage Technology STC, Memorex, Control Data CDC, Univac and Burroughs in the design & development process. In an e ort to cut o the supply of components to its competitors, by 1963, IBM had brought the manufacturing activity in-house, setting o a vertical integration trend in the industry Christensen 1995 . Christensen cites an internal IBM document to also point out that this trend coincided with a much broder trend of vertical integration in the industry associated with the launch of IBM's mainfraim System 360. By 1978 this trend had reversed. The leading rms started moving away from vertical integration and towards specialization For more details of the industry's history see Christensen 1995 . While the transaction cost literature has typically viewed these developments in terms of the internal capabilities of the rms, the changing make -buy may instead be optimal responses to changing industry structure, especially of suppliers of components.
model, market price depends on the supply curves of all existing producers, and hence, upon the average e ciency of all producers. 5 Also, we assume increasing marginal costs, while Farrell et al. assume constant marginal costs.
In the next section we set out a simple model of a competitive market and brie y discuss its steady state. Section 3 reports on the dynamic properties of the model that we explore through numerical simulations. We provide intuition for these properties in section 4 by analytically describing the properties of the entry and exit process. In section 5 we endogenise transaction costs as a function of the number of transactions. Our simulations highlight the interactions when both extent of specialization and transaction costs are endogenous. Section 6 summarizes our results and concludes the paper.
II The Model
We model a competitive market with both vertically integrated and specialized rms. We assume that the nal product I consists of two components, H and S. One unit each of H and S are needed to produce one unit of I. A rm can either integrate the production of both components in-house or it may specialize in the production of either of the two components. We assume that due to incompatibility in design, integrated rms do not buy from or sell to other rms. 6 where low cost rms survive and high cost rms exit. 7 Potential entrants choose whether to enter and their type I-type, H-type or S-type, based on the current market prices and their own e ciency parameters s and h . Post entry, costs do not change no learning, and if it becomes unpro table to continue producing as a particular type over time, we assume that a rm exits the industry rather than switch its organizational form. 8 We assume that at most one rm can enter in a given period. A potential entrant draws two random values, h and s . The potential entrant looks at only the current prices and chooses whether to enter, and if so, as an S, H, or I type producer based on which form would earn the highest pro t. Similarly, incumbents who realize negative pro ts exit, with the rm realizing the least pro t exiting rst. After the exit, the remaining rms evaluate their pro ts at the changed prices, as de ned by 6a,b above, and if pro ts for some rms are still negative, the rm 7 Following Jovanovic 1982 the model allows rms to di er in output due to di erences in e ciency rather than in xity of capital. However, following Porter 1980 & Klepper 1996 , the e ciency parameter of rms is a random variable with a uniform and continuous distribution. 8 Ohanian 1994 in her study of the U.S. Pulp and Paper Industry between 1900-1940, found that few mills switched between integration and specialization once established. Once again, permitting such switches amounts to allowing a di erent t ype of entry. Allowing integrated rms to close unpro table businesses would only enhance the prospects for specialization.
with the lowest pro ts exits. This process is repeated until all incumbents have non-negative pro ts. The last exit after each entry marks the end of a period.
Note that in our model, exit takes place sequentially, with prices recomputed after each exit. The assumption of myopic decision making rms focus only on current period pro tability in making their decisions simpli es our analysis. However, given the uncertainty i n the environment and the possibility of multiple equilibrium paths, making fully forward looking decisions is costly. Moreover, myopic decision making is almost rational, due to assumptions already made in the model: rms are price takers, there is no learning", and sunk costs are absent. Introducing forward looking behavior will not e ect the output decision since there is no learning and no strategic behavior. There is possible option value to entering the market or staying in even if currently unpro table because prices may increase in the future. 9 Calculating the value of such a real option is di cult to say the least, and we ignore the option value of entering or remaining in the market. Note however that but for the jumps caused by the lumpiness of entry and exit the number of rms is an integer, prices would never rise over time since there is no demand uncertainty. Thus, if current pro ts are negative, then future pro ts would also be negative, implying an option value of zero. Forward looking behavior could conceivably a ect the decision on the form of entry but the direction of the e ect is unclear.
Note that we do not allow a potential entrant t o s i m ultaneously enter as both an H a n d S t ype. Although unrealistic, this assumption is made largely for expository purposes. To a n ticipate our results below, we nd that the dynamics of the industry evolution favor specialization even when integration is more e cient in the long run i:e:; when , 2 0 . Allowing the entry of two specialized rms in a period would automatically decrease the value of the measure of the degree of vertical integration that we use. Allowing the entry of two specialized rms in one period could lead to the reader to believe incorrectly that assumption to be the key factor driving our results, potentially obscuring the more fundamental e ects we wish to highlight. 10 II iii Long Run Industry Structure. In the stationary state, i.e., when opportunities for pro table entry have vanished, free entry implies that the industry structure the organizational form of the rms in the industry is determined entirely by the di erence in the minimum average cost between the two organizational forms. See gure 1 below. If the cost of coordinating activities within rms is less than the cost of transacting over markets 2 the industry will be completely vertically integrated. 11 When , 2 = 0, the long run structure of the Figure 1 . Long run Equilibrium industry is indeterminate. Put di erently, the long run industry structure is simply the structure that has lower costs in our terminology, the e cient structure.
Thus, vertical integration is e cient when , 2 0.
III Dynamics of Evolution
Though a stationary-state analysis is useful in understanding the e ect of certain factors, it obscures interesting aspects of the dynamics of industry evolution. In particular, it obscures the role of di erences in the distribution of capabilities efciency parameters as well as of any i n terdependencies in decisions. We explored how these factors a ect the convergence of the industry to its long run structure through numerical simulations.
In the rst phase of simulations, was xed and simulations were studied for di erent v alues of , 2 , where , 2 ranges from ,2 to +2 . Each simulation lasted for 500 periods. We ran 35 simulations for each v alue of , 2 the simulation results. Brie y, they show that convergence to the long run equilibrium tends to be slow. They also show that the dynamic evolution of the industry is asymmetric with respect to the e cient industry structure. When vertical integration is the least cost long run structure i.e., , 2 0, convergence is slow and uneven, particularly when , 2 is small. indicating the standard deviation around the average. 12 Over time, prices fall. 12 We ran 35 simulations for each v alue of , 2 . All in all, we ran over 2000 simulations including those with slightly di erent v ersions of the model, with very similar results. A more complete discription of simulation design and algorithm is given in appendix I. Further note that in all the gures, the error bars represnt the standard error and not standard deviation. Our simulations showed that 35 runs per value of , 2 were enough in the sense that they gave u s the asymptotic distrbutions, so that running further simulations will not be of much use is giving However, comparing across di erent values of , 2 , prices in the 500 th period tend to be somewhat higher when ,2 is small. This is partly because variables take longer to reach their steady state values when neither organizational form is markedly more e cient. But there is more to the story because the e ect is not symmetric: Prices are noticeably higher in the 500 th period when integration is the least cost organizational form. The asymmetry is corroborated by gure 3 which shows that the average value of s and h for the S and H type rms in the 500 th period is lower, the lower is , 2 when integration is more e cient but remains largely constant for , 2 positive. By contrast, the average i for the I-type rms is higher the lower is , 2 .
Both of these asymmetries are also re ected in gure 4 which shows the evolution of the industry structure. In essence, when specialization is the e cient long run organizational form , 2 0, the industry structure rapidly converges to specialization, and increases in the extent of the cost di erence, ,2 , do not have an appreciable e ect beyond a point. By contrast, when integration is e cient, as long as , 2 is small, the industry structure continues to be mixed: Specialized rms are likely to have a substantial market share, which decreases as the extent o f us tighter estimates of the standard deviation of the mean. As a check, we ran 35 additional simulations for a selected value of , 2 . Not only did the mean and the standard deviation remain substantially unchanged di erences were of the order of 1-2, the entire distrbution did not change by m uch. As expected, the standard error of the mean fell with the square root of N. Figure 4 . Snapshot of Mean VI, For Exogenious cost advantage to integration increases. In particular, when both forms are equally e cient, the average degree of vertical integration in the industry is only about 20, well below the 50 that one might expect based on steady state analysis alone. Notice also that the standard errors for the I-type rms tend to be larger when , 2 is negative than for corresponding positive v alues of , 2 . Figure 5 shows some typical time paths of VI for di erent v alues , 2 . The gure shows that when , 2 is negative but small, VI actually moves away from its steady state value of 1, at least for the duration of the simulation. However, when , 2 0, VI evolves towards its steady state value of 1. By contrast, for , 2 0, VI almost always tends towards zero.
Our simulations revealed two further patterns. First, as gure 5 shows, very early in the history of the industry integrated entry is more likely than specialized entry. This recalls a prediction by Stigler 1951 that vertical integration is more likely early in the industry life-cycle because a new industry is likely to have to produce its inputs itself. As discussed below, in our model, integrated entry early p n is the standard deviation of the mean in the industry life cycle is taking place for a very di erent reason -prices are higher early in the life cycle and fall over time. We explain below in section IV why l o w er prices should favor specialized entry. The simulations also show that outcomes are sensitive to initial conditions. Table 1 shows that when both organizational forms are equally e cient in the long run, starting with high levels of vertical integration implies that the expected level of vertical integration is higher, and the di erence is statistically signi cant.
To sum up, simulations with exogenous transaction and coordination costs have three features that need to be explained. 1 The dynamic processes are asymmetric. Convergence is slower and more uneven when integration rather than specialization is the steady state. Put di erently, chance seems to favor specialization. 2 Integrated entry is more likely than specialized industry early in the industry life cycle but the odds of integrated entry appear to fall over time. 3 All else held equal, if the industry starts out as vertically integrated, the expected level of vertical integration is higher IV Explaining the dynamics What accounts for the speci c patterns of industry evolution that the simulation results reveal? In this section we provide the intuition by examining the properties of the entry and exit process implied by our model. We begin by formalizing the division of labor e ect lemma 1 and the Babbage e ect lemma 2, which point t o advantages of specialization as compared with the integrated form. The complex interactions between price levels and the transaction and coordination costs imply that we can only partially characterize the conditions under which specialized entry is more likely than integrated entry in proposition 1. However, a potential entrant may c hoose integration because a key private bene t of integration is that it allows a rm to pro t from two activities rather than only one proposition 2. Proposition 3 clari es how nal outcomes are sensitive to initial conditions. Division of labor e ect: Di erences in h and s along with the assumption of increasing marginal costs implies that an integrated rm cannot take full advantage of its greater e ciency in one activity. As an illustration, let s = 1 and h = 2 , and p q = 1 2 ; p s = 6, so that p h = 6 as well. Then the pro t maximizing quantities for the S and H rms are 2.5 and 1 respectively, and their marginal costs are 6 and 6. An integrated rm has to produce the two components in xed proportions.
Thus, it will produce 1.5 units, with a marginal cost of 4 in the s activity and a marginal cost of 8 in the h activity. This implies that it underproduces s and overproduces h. Lemma By a similar argument, h h ;q i h h . The result follows directly. 13 Lemma 1 implies that entry requirements for integrated entry are more stringent. h . This corollary implies that for any given set of prices, the range of values for which i n tegrated rms can enter or survive in the market is smaller than for specialized rms. Note that since the inequalities are strict, the results will continue to hold even when , 2 is negative but small enough. Formally we h a v e, Corollary 2. Babbage E ect: There is a second e ect favoring specialization, which arises from the assumption that the parameters h and s are independently distributed. 13 When h s = pq , ps ps , qs = q h = q i , so that s s;q i = s s. An integrated rm's e ciency parameter, i , is the sum of h and s that the rm draws. This implies that for any x s ; x h 2 1; 2 ; P r i x s + x h P r s x s + P r h x h :In other words, a potential entrant is more likely to be e cient at one of the activities rather than be good enough on average at both.
The assumption that h and s are identically distributed also implies that the probability distribution of i is more strongly clustered around the mean than the original distribution. This follows because i 2 is the average of two independent random variables. In particular, when the distribution of s , gt is uniform over 1; 2 , the probability distribution, ft o f i = 2 is given by ft f o r i Corollary 3. There existsx2 1; 2 such that P r f h + s 2 x g P r f h x g = P r f s x g for all x x .
The proof follows directly by noting that lemma 2 implies that F crosses G from below. Combining with the corollaries to lemma 1, the corollary to lemma 2 highlights the implications of the Babbage e ect. It suggests that when prices are su ciently low so that the entry requires a very low v alue of the necessary conditions for integrated entry are less likely to be satis ed than for entry by S and H types. Proposition 1 formalizes this intuition for the case where p q = 2p s so that the entry thresholds are the same for the S and H types. high enough to permit specialized entry. 14 Proposition 1 clari es the source of the asymmetry in the convergence to long run equilibrium between the cases when integration is e cient and when specialization is e cient. As long as coordination costs are not much larger than transaction costs and potential entrants are not at their maximal e ciency h , s 1, specialization is advantageous. When prices are low and entry conditions are stringent, specialized entry is more likely than integrated entry. However, a potential entrant may choose integration if prices are high enough to enable it to earn rents from both types of activities. A potential entrant will enter as an integrated rm if i h + s M a x f s s , h h , 0g, with analogous expressions for entry as S a n d H t ype. in prices over time lower the probability o f e n try of all types of rms, but propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the probability of integrated entry falls relative to that for specialized entry. We con rm this intuition numerically by showing that the relative odds of integrated entry fall with prices. Figure 7 , which is drawn for a symmetric path with p q = 2p s , shows that for high prices, the conditional probability o f integrated entry is high and drops as prices drop. The larger the value of , 2 , the greater the conditional probability o f i n tegrated entry for any given price. When the advantage to integration is only modest, the conditional probability can drop below 0.5 implying that balanced" specialized entry a specialized rm followed by a complementary type in the next period is more likely than integrated entry. However, when integration is the e cient form in the long run, eventually prices fall enough to choke o specialized entry while still leaving Figure 7 . Probability I-Type EntersjGiven Entry room for integrated entry. At this point, the conditional probability o f i n tegrated entry increases sharply. We next show that the evolutionary dynamics are not neutral to the type of entry that takes place. Proposition 3 below shows that balanced" specialized entry tends to lower all prices by a greater amount than an entry by an I-type rm. In order to do so, we rst state and prove in lemma 3 a result about the expected values of the inverse of e ciency parameters. Lemma Proof. Note rst that when there are an equal numb e r o f S a n d H t ype rms, p h and p s are linearly related. Thus, if one increases, the other will increase as well. Further, from 6a and 6b, note that S i g n dp q dm dm,dn=0 = S i g n dp s dm dm,dn=0 = S i g n s + h i , h s :
Taking expectations and using the fact that s and h are iid variables, and hence, so are s and h , i t follows that S i g n E dpq dm dm,dn=0 = S i g n E h 2 i , s . Since each rm's draws are independent, it follows that S i g n E dp q dm dm,dn=0 = S i g nE
which is negative b y lemma 3 since E h is positive. 15 Proposition 3 is consistent with the results that Farrell et al. 1998 obtain where industry costs and prices are always lower under specialization. Combined with proposition 2, it explains the time paths in gure 5 and the sensitivity to initial conditions. Proposition 3 shows that prices tend to be lower when the initial industry structure has a larger share of specialized rms. Lower prices, even as they decrease the absolute probability o f e n try, tend to increase the odds of specialized entry, b y propositions 1 and 2. Thus, all else held constant, starting with a highly specialized industry may encourage further specialized entry.
These results imply that even when integration is the more e cient form, the industry structure does not necessarily converge monotonically to it, but instead can diverge away from it for sustained periods. This divergence is important because a v ariety of factors may prevent the industry structure from reaching the e cient state. For instance, suppose that rms have to incur a small cost in order to observe their e ciency parameters. Such information acquisition costs are neutral with respect to choice of entry type. Also, when expected pro ts are high, as they are in the initial stages of an industry, this cost is irrelevant and the industry will evolve as described above. However, over time as prices fall, the expected pro t from entry may fall enough that entry stops altogether. It is then likely that the industry will retain a high degree of specialization even though there are advantages to integration.
V Endogenous Transaction Costs
As noted earlier, long run cost di erences between the di erent organizational forms play a k ey role in the evolution of industry structure. We h a v e modeled these di erences as arising due to transaction costs. It seems reasonable to suppose that transaction costs would depend on the number of transactions. For one, as the number of transactions increase, intermediary rms and other institutions that we do not model explicitly may arise to facilitate transactions. If the major transaction cost are due to imperfect compatibility and standardization, an increase in the number of transactions may lead to the development o f de facto standards. Alternatively, industry associations or public policy may lead such a standardization e ort. The xed costs of such initiatives implies that they are not worthwhile unless the value and number of transactions is large.
To the extent that transaction costs are due to negotiation and contracting costs, an increase in the number of transactions may induce entry by e cient i n termediary institutions, as well as the introduction of new transaction technologies. In turn, intermediaries can help standardize contracts, reduce search costs and improve the e ciency of transactions. We model this process by letting be a function of the numberof transactions". In our model, the number of transactions is equal to the output of specialized rms. For our numerical simulations, we used two di erent types of functional forms. In the rst, transaction costs decreased linearly with the ratio of the output of the specialized rms to the total market output i.e. = VI.
In the second, decreased linearly with the ratio of the output of the specialized rms to the total potential market output, i.e., = , P m h q h M where M is the quantity demanded when price is equal to the long run average cost i.e. the minimum average cost for i = 2. Both forms yield very similar results see table 2 and in the discussion we will focus on the results for the rst speci cation. Note also that long run costs are lower under specialization.
V i Results. How should the endogeneity o f a ect our earlier results? In essence, we h a v e i n troduced a form of real industry level increasing returns to specialization a type of network externality. As is well known, network externalities tend to produce multiple equilibria, and dynamics that are sensitive to initial conditions. So also in our model.
As table 1b shows, in our model, the industry moves either towards complete integration or complete specialization with very high probability. In other words, the movement t o w ards a long run value is more rapid than in the case with exogenous . Further, initial conditions matter and so do small chance events early in the history. For instance, a high degree of initial vertical integration is likely to cause integration to increase further, and conversely, a l o w degree of vertical integration at the start tends to result in a specialized industry structure with a higher probability. There are two reasons. First, as we h a v e already seen in propositions 2 & 3, a higher degree of integration implies somewhat higher prices on average, and therefore, higher odds of integrated as compared with specialized entry. Further, a high degree of vertical integration implies a large value of . Nonetheless, chance continues to play an important role as well. Even when the initial industry conguration is dominated by v ertically integrated organizational form, there is about a 20 probability that the other organizational form will eventually dominate.
Although we do not show it here, we also simulated how the time paths are a ected by a c hange in the number of rms and shifts in demand. With a given demand curve, starting with fewer rms amounts to starting with higher prices. As proposition 3 suggests, this favors integrated entry. 16 Integrated entry also increases , thereby h urting specialized rms, both incumbents and potential entrants. The latter e ect, which is absent in the case with exogenous , implies that when there are increasing returns to specialization, an industry is more, not less, likely to become integrated. The reason is simple. Early in the history of the industry, higher prices favor integrated entry. However, by raising , integrated entry hurts incumbent and potential specialized rms. Through a feedback process, the industry moves towards complete integration. A similar reasoning suggests that increasing the intercept of the demand curve will also increase the probability that the industry will be ine ciently integrated in the long run: As the demand curve shifts out, the average price increases, thereby increasing the likelihood of integrated entry.
V ii Social Welfare Implications. With endogenous transaction costs a specialized industry con guration is always socially more e cient in our model. Transaction costs decline with the extent of specialization, so that a fully specialized industry con guration has a value of = 0 . However, as our simulations strongly suggest, vertical integration can be the long run equilibrium, particularly if the industry starts with a high degree of vertical integration.
Using the parameter values we use for the simulations, we can quantify the extent of long run welfare loss. In the long run, since price is equal to minimum average cost, producer surplus is zero. Thus, the change in welfare is equal to change in the consumer surplus. With complete specialization, the long run price of q is equal to 6, which, given the demand curve P q = 4 0 , q , implies a consumer surplus of 578.
With complete vertical integration, the long run price is equal to 6.6, which implies a consumer surplus of a little over 557. This implies that when the relevant xed costs, and average value, are about 7.5 of the average costs, the welfare loss from integration is about 3.6.
As costs associated with the choice of organizational form increase in importance, so do the welfare losses. For instance, if were to double, the welfare losses would also approximately double to about 7.5. Similarly, i f w e shift the demand curve to the right, the percentage of welfare losses decrease, although they increase in absolute levels. The intuition is that since long run prices are determined strictly by the long run average costs, an outward shift of the demand curve implies a decrease in the elasticity of demand. With a given price di erence between the two organizational forms, this implies a lower percentage welfare loss. However, the shift in demand also implies a larger equilibrium quantity, and hence the absolute welfare loss is greater . For a similar reason, holding all else constant, if one doubles the xed costs and , the welfare loss increases from 3.6 to about 4.14 but decrease in absolute amount.
VI Summary and Conclusions
We develop a simple model of vertical integration and specialization in an industry. Specialization implies that one does not have to acquire competencies in all activities Babbage e ect. Furthermore, when such competencies are not perfectly matched, integrating the activities based on those activities imposes an additional cost division of labor e ect. These ideas have n o w gained currency under the more modern title of core-competency". The other important element of our model is that that specialization and division of labor across rms involves trade, and therefore involves coordination of decisions. When these decisions are made by rms that enter and exit over time, the dynamic evolution of the system may be conditioned by its current state, and not simply by its long run equilibrium.
The dynamics displayed by our model supports this intuition. The Babbage effect and the division of labor e ect tend to move the industry towards specialization When there integration is only slightly more long run e cient than specialization, the short term dynamics in favor of specialization counteracts the long run lower costs associated with integration, causing the industry to evolve a w a y from its long run equilibrium, albeit temporarily. This transient divergence is nonetheless interesting because should further entry into an industry be stopped for any reason, the industry structure would look very di erent from its long run situation.
When we explicitly allow for industry level increasing returns to specialization by allowing the level of transaction costs to decline with the degree of specialization, the industry may not achieve its cost minimizing structure even in the long run. In our model, complete specialization is more e cient when transaction costs decline with the number of transactions. Nonetheless, depending on the initial conditions and on chance events early in the industry life cycle, specialization is only attained with probability that ranges from 20 to about 85. It is likely, a s i n F arrell et al 1998 , that these probabilities would be even lower if incumbent i n tegrated rms can behave strategically to lower the share of specialized rms and raise the level of transaction costs.
Our results point to the limitations of the transaction cost perspective on the extent of the division of labor across rms. The transaction cost perspective is limited in two important respects. The rst has to do with the number of sellers. Transaction cost based models recognize the small number of suppliers problem. What is obscured is that the small numbers of suppliers is likely to a ect the number of actual and potential buyers, and vice versa Introducing explicit dynamics shows that the dynamic evolution of an industry is not simply governed by its steady state, but can diverge away from the steady state for sustained periods.
The second major limitation of the transaction cost model is the endogeneity o f the level of the transaction costs. Transaction cost models correctly note that the level of transaction costs determine the number of market transactions. However, if the thickness of the market itself a ects the cost of transacting over the market, then di erent long run structures of the industry are possible. If so, when industries are geographically limited, the structure of an industry may v ary signi cantly across countries or regions. In other words, our model suggests that transactions costs themselves may be conditioned by industry structure. Or, to use Allyn Young's insightful conclusion reached nearly seventy y ears ago, the division of labor is limited by the division of labor Appendix 1 Parameter values used in the simulations; = = 1 ; a = 40; b = , 1. Starting number of rms = 20 integrated equivalents. A pair of H and S type rms is treated as equivalent to one integrated rm. For the endogenious case, the cost of coordianation, was set equal to 0.5.
Simulation Design. Simulations were run for exogenous and endogenous . For exogenous , we varied -2 between -2 and 2 incremented by 0.2. At the average values of and , the long run average cost are about 6.6, and the total cost per rm are about 7.36. This implies that the total xed costs for the specialized form = + + 2 = 2.5, or about 33 of the total cost. Thus our simulations imply that the xed costs of the integrated form ranges between 2 and 3. Put di erently, the variation is a little less than 15 of total cost.
For each v alue of -2 , we ran thirty v e simulations. All the variables and initial conditions were the same across each set of 35 simulations, except for the seed used to generate the random numbers within a simulation, which was di erent. Thus, a total of 3521 = 735 simulations was run for exogenous with the initial number of rms chosen such that the initial degree of vertical integration was about 0.5. In addition, we also ran some simulations for the exogenous case with the initial conditions such that the vertical integration in the rst period was about 0.2 or 0.8. For both low and high initial VI, -2 was set at -2, 0 and 2 t h us the additional simulations were, 353 2 = 210.
For the endogenous case, we c hose three types of initial conditions: i low initial VI, ii medium initial VI and, iii high initial VI. For each case, thirty v e simulations were run and recorded. In addition, all three cases were also simulated using di erent speci cations for the functional form to endogenise . The results were robust to the speci cation of the functional form. The total number of simulations for the endogenous case per functional form were 353 = 105.
All simulations were run for 500 periods a period is de ned in the paper. For each simulation, the value of twenty two variables was recorded at each period. In addition, we also kept track of the initial conditions and the value of the seed used to generate the random numbers. This helps us to regenerate any particular simulation. Finally, w e repeated the simulation experiment for di erent v alues of the demand curve parameters.
Algorithm 1 for Simulations. Period 1:
Set initial number of rms of each type. Given the number of rms of each type, generate as many random numbers between appropriate ranges for the e ciency parameters. Use Equations 4a,b,c to compute the output of each rm. If the output of any rm is negative, delete that rm. Given the parameters of the demand curve slope and intercept use equations 6a,b to compute market prices. Given market prices, compute the pro ts of each rm. If rms have pro ts less than zero, then delete the rm with the most negative pro t. Recompute prices and pro ts. Repeat, until all rms have non-negative pro t. At this point, record the total outputs, number of rms of each type, prices, degree of vertical integration and other variables of interest, as the rst period values. Period t:
Generate two random numbers between 1 and 2.
Given the prices at the end of the t ,1 period and the two random numbers generated, compute potential outputs and potential pro ts for H-type, S-type and I-type where the potential pro ts for I-type are computed using the sum of the two random numbers just generated. An entry is marked i.e., the number of rms of j-type increase by one if the potential output is non-negative and the potential pro t is maximum and non-negative.
If entry takes place, recompute the prices 6a,b outputs 4a,b and pro ts of all existing rms.
If rms have negative outputs or negative pro ts, they exit i.e. are deleted sequentially. The rm making the most negative pro t exits rst. Prices, outputs and pro ts of all remaining rms are recomputed. The process is repeated until none of the incumbents have negative outputs or pro ts. At this point, record the total outputs, prices, number of rms of each t ype, degree of vertical integration and other variables of interest, as the t period values. Appendix 2 Characterizing Entry Conditions: The necessary entry condition is that the potential entrant draw an e ciency parameter such that with the given prices, p q and p s , it should earn non-negative pro t. Using = = 1, the threshold value for an I-type rm can be written as i = p q + 22 + , 22 
